药品行业 药品竞争无国界 西方国家和新兴市场的制药公司正互相蚕食对方的市场

原文链接：http://www.economist.com/node/21542410

TO GET an idea of where the world’s pharmaceutical industry is heading, a leafy complex tucked off a hectic road in Mumbai provides a clue. In one part of the building, Abbott, an American firm, is developing generic drugs—a privilege it won when it bought the copycat business of Piramal, an Indian firm, for $3.7 billion in 2010. In the other part of the building Piramal is developing new drugs. The American firm wants to sell cheap generics in India; the Indian firm plans to sell original drugs in America. One might think that they were having an identity crisis, if each were not so excited by the switch.

The world’s drug industry is in flux. In the past, Western drugmakers thrived on innovation while firms in emerging markets made cheap copies of their products. Now they are invading each other’s turf. Blockbuster drugs are losing their patents and, despite some bright spots, research has become more costly and less fruitful. Big Western firms are now looking to emerging markets for growth, hoping to sell not just their patented drugs but generic ones, too. Firms in emerging markets are expanding their footprint, ramping up sales in the West and investing in research. It is an energetic exchange, but a risky one.

It is no surprise that Western drugmakers are looking further afield. America’s spending on prescription drugs increased by just 2.3% in 2010. As incomes rise elsewhere, the demand for health care grows. IMS Health, a research group, expects emerging markets’ share of drug spending to jump from 12% in 2005 to 28% in 2015.

Western companies are keen to tap this growth. Sanofi-Aventis, a French giant, has become the biggest producer of generic drugs in Latin America after its purchase in 2010 of Medley, a Brazilian firm. Not to be left out, America’s Pfizer, the world’s biggest drugmaker, bought 40% of Teuto, a Brazilian generics company. Some firms also hope that developing countries—many chock full of talented scientists—will help to fill their bare pipelines with new drugs. Merck, for example, recently announced that it would create a new research and development centre in Beijing, investing $1.5 billion over five years.

Blockbuster bets

Many generics firms are keen to become more innovative. The model is Israel’s Teva. It is the world’s biggest generic drugmaker, but nearly a fifth of its sales in 2010 came from a patented blockbuster, Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. To boost its research muscle, Teva last year paid nearly $7 billion for Cephalon, an American firm that sells cancer and pain medicines. And on January 1st it poached a new boss, Jeremy Levin, from Bristol-Myers Squibb, another American firm.

No company from the developing world has yet come up with a portfolio as diverse as Teva’s, but that may change. Brazil hopes that public investment will nudge its biotech industry forward. In India, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), a consultancy, estimates that drug sales will grow 15-20% a year, creating oodles of opportunities. The Indian market is dominated by local firms selling “branded generics”—copies made by trusted generic firms. Recently, however, firms from rich countries have plunged in. Daiichi Sankyo, a Japanese drugmaker, bought India’s Ranbaxy in 2008 for $4.6 billion. Smaller deals followed, such as Reckitt Benckiser’s purchase of Paras Pharma. Abbott bought Piramal’s generic business for a whopping nine times its annual sales.

India’s drugmakers have many home-turf advantages, including long relationships with Indian doctors and hospitals. But they are also keen to reach consumers elsewhere. They are using several tactics.

One is to produce as many generic drugs as cheaply as possible. For many Indian firms America is their biggest market. They are eager to lower prices to grab a greater share. At a Dr Reddy’s plant in Hyderabad, huge blenders mix chemicals; powder is compressed into tiny tablets; green and white capsules jumble out of machines like popcorn; workers pack boxes methodically. An unskilled worker at the factory is paid a few thousand dollars a year. Dr Reddy’s may automate more processes to hedge against rising labour costs.

Another tactic is to buy foreign drugmakers, though this does not always work. In 2006 Dr Reddy’s bought Betapharm, a German generics firm, but supply problems and new price rules in Germany turned that into a disaster. Sun Pharmaceuticals, India’s biggest drugmaker, is trying to buy full ownership of Taro, an Israeli drug firm, but some of Taro’s shareholders are stubbornly against the idea.

The riskiest tactic for generics makers is to try to invent their own drugs. Changes in Indian patent law help—it now protects intellectual property better than before. But research is still hard in India: academics are reluctant to collaborate with filthy capitalists, and local investors are wary of the slow slog of drug discovery. “These are generic companies trying to be innovative companies, and it is not clear that those skills match,” says Sujay Shetty of PWC. However, he points to some exceptions.

Research requires cash. Piramal, thanks to the sale of its generics business, has plenty. Ajay Piramal, the firm’s boss, wants to create a new blockbuster. “It is the patented drugs that will be the real game changer,” he says confidently. Glenmark, a smaller firm, has had success by conducting early research, then licensing its technologies to Western firms with the money to conduct clinical trials.

Even as firms mimic each other, some judge that it is wise to collaborate as well as compete. India’s Lupin has a deal to market Eli Lilly’s anti-diabetic drugs in India and Nepal. Other collaborators have a broader reach. Sun Pharmaceuticals has a joint venture with Merck to develop and market generics throughout the developing world. Pfizer will license insulin products from India’s Biocon. The deal will bolster revenue as Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw, Biocon’s ambitious boss, continues to invest in new biotech drugs.

A lot could still go wrong with these new approaches to drugmaking. Research is risky: miracle molecules often turn out to be useless or dangerous. Acquisitions often go wrong, too: Daiichi Sankyo must surely regret paying so much for Ranbaxy. The rules governing medicine are strict and unpredictable. American regulators are trying to enforce stringent standards for foreign factories. India might broaden price controls.

Yet the battle to invent new cures and conquer new markets will grow fiercer, and the distinction between innovative rich-world drug firms and emerging-market copycats will continue to blur. Disease pays no heed to borders. Increasingly, drug firms won’t, either.


若想知道世界制药行业的发展状况，从印度孟买的那条崎岖复杂且车水马龙的林阴大道上能窥探出端倪。在美国雅培公司大楼一侧，该司正在开发非专利药——该司于2010年花了37亿美元并购了山寨厂皮拉马尔（Piramal）后便获得了生产非专利药的特许权。在雅培大楼的另一侧，该司正在研发新药。这家美国公司想在印度销售廉价的学名药；印度的公司却计划将原制药打入美国市场。有人或许会认为，如果美国和印度的药厂是如此渴望互相进入对手市场，他们将会面临同样的认同危机。

全球制药行业扑朔迷离。过去，西方市场的制药厂兴起于创新药物，而新兴市场的公司发迹于廉价的山寨药。现在，他们正在互相蚕食对方的市场。畅销药品正面临着专利的失效问题，尽管不乏一些亮点显现，但药物的研发成本更高，且成效更差。西方巨头为求发展，正垂涎新兴市场，希望将专利药品和学名药统统归于名下销售。新兴市场的制药公司正谋求不断扩张，染指西方市场及扩大研发投入。这是积极的互动，但却是冒险之举。

西方制药公司正立足长远打算，这不足为奇。2010年，美国处方药销售仅上升2.3%。随着世界各地收入的提高，对卫生保健的需求也逾增。艾美仕市场研究公司（IMS Health）预计新兴市场的药品销售份额从2005的12%上升至2015年的28%。

西方企业正虎视眈眈，急于搭上非专利药品的增长快车。法国巨头赛诺菲安万特（Sanofi-Aventis）于2010年将巴西的Medley纳入旗下后，成为拉丁美洲最大的非专利药生产厂家。全球最大的制约公司美国辉瑞（Pfizer）也不甘示弱，购得巴西非专利生产公司Teuto 40%的股份。有些公司也寄希望于发展中国家——科学家队伍人才济济——能协助填补新药开发空白。例如，默克公司（Merck）最近宣布未来五年，将在北京投资15亿美元创立新的研发中心。

押宝畅销品

许多非专利公司热切希望提升创新能力。典型代表便是以色列的梯瓦制药（Teva）。该司是世界上最大的非专利制药公司，但是2010年其近五分之一的消费来源于治疗多发性硬化症（multiple sclerosis）的热销品克帕松(Copaxone)。为了增强其科研实力，去年梯瓦公司花了将近70亿美元并购了美国瑟法隆（Cephalon）公司。瑟法隆公司主要销售治癌药和止痛药。2012年，梯瓦公司从另一家美国公司——百时美施贵宝（Bristol-Myers Squibb）挖来杰里米•莱文（Jeremy Levin）作为其新任老板。

没有一家来自发展中国家的公司在产品的多样化组合上能与Teva公司抗衡。但这一格局有可能要打破。巴西人希望政府投资能促进其生物技术产业发展。在印度，普华永道（PWC）咨询服务公司预计药品销售以每年15%-20%的速度增长，真是商机无限。印度市场由当地销售“品牌学名药”的公司所统治着——这些学名药由可信的公司生产。但最近来自发达国家的企业却横刀夺爱，插足非专利药品市场。日本医药制造商第一三共（Daiichi Sankyo）以46亿美元购下印度的兰伯西（RANBAXY）。一些较小的并购也层出不穷，如Reckitt Benckiser（利洁时）买下了Paras Pharma；雅培以皮拉马尔（Piramal）年销售额九倍的天价将这家非专利药品公司尽收囊中。

印度的制造商具有不少本土优势，包括与印度医生和医院的长期合作关系。但他们也急切地希望开辟其他市场。他们使用如下几种策略。

第一种策略是尽可能地降低非专利药品的价格。对印度的许多公司来说，美国是他们最大的药品市场。他们渴望通过低价策略获取更多的市场份额。在海得拉巴（Hyderabad）雷迪（Reddy）博士的工厂里，巨大的搅拌机把各种化学物混合在一起；各种粉状物被压缩成小小的药片；绿的，白的药片像爆米花一样不断地蹦出来；工人们有条不紊地打着包。该厂一个非熟练工一年的工资只有几千美元。为了应付不断上涨的劳动力成本，雷迪博士可能采取更多的自动化程序。

另一策略是买下外国药品制造商，尽管这一招并非百试百灵。2006年，雷迪博士买下了德国的一家制造非专利药品的厂家Betapharm。但是供应链问题及德国新出台的价格规定导致这次收购变成一场灾难。印度最大的制药公司太阳制药正设法合资控股以色列的药品公司Taro。但是Taro的一些股东却坚决反对这一想法。

对非专利药品生产厂家来说，最冒险的策略是自制药品。印度专利法为之保驾护航——现如今，印度比以前更重视保护知识产权。但是印度的药品研发仍举步维艰：学术界人士不愿与肮脏的资本家同流合污，且当地投资者担心药物开发漫长而艰难的过程。普华永道（PWC）的Sujay Shetty说:“这些生产非专利药品的公司试图转变为具有创新能力的公司，尚不清楚他们是否具备这些技能”。但他也指出了一些例外情况。

研发需要资金的支持。皮拉马尔公司幸亏因销售非专利药品而积攒了不少资金。该司老板阿贾伊•皮拉马尔（Ajay Piramal）想创造新的畅销品。他自信地说“专利产品才真正是游戏规则的制定者”。 经营规模较小的Glenmark（格伦马克）制药公司，因早进入药品研发领域而大获成功，之后该司将技术授权给西方企业，所得的款项投入于临床实验中。

即便公司之间竞相模仿，有些人认为合作与竞争一样是明智的选择。印度的Lupin公司和礼来制药公司（Eli Lilly）达成协议在印度和尼泊尔销售后者的抗糖尿病药物。其他的合作者达成更广泛的合作。太阳制药与默克公司合作组建合资公司以谋求在整个发展中国家地区开发和销售药品。辉瑞（Pfizer）从印度的百康(Biocon)公司处获得特许权。随着百康极有抱负的老板克兰玛兹穆德—肖（Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw）持续投资于新生物技术药物领域，这一合作协议将会促进销售的增长。

对于制药领域来说，这些新的策略仍存在诸多问题。研发存在风险：神奇的化学分子常变为一堆废品或危险品。兼并也常会有纰漏。日本的第一三共必定后悔天价收购兰伯西。 对药品的政府管制不但要求严格且无法预测。美国的监管者试图对国外的工厂实施严格标准。印度有可能扩大价格控制范围。

但是发明新药和占领新市场的战争愈演愈烈，且西方世界的创新能力强的制药公司和新兴市场的山寨公司之间的差别将越来越小。疾病无国界。假以时日，医药公司也将无国界运行。

假以时日，医药公司也将无国界运行.战争愈演愈烈?

竞争是好事，能对老百姓有利就更好啦！